Antitrust Agreement

3 décembre 2020

45th order DOT 2008-4-17 at 2 o`clock. In 2010, DOT provisionally refused to grant antitrust immunity to Delta Airlines and virgin Blue Because « the complainants have virtually no experience as business partners and apply business processes that they consider incompatible. » (see 2010 DOT command-9-4 to 2) We propose to use data for 2005-2010 to provide more up-to-date information on the impact of rules-free subsidies on cartels and abuse of dominance and on the number of non-stop competitors on transatlantic routes. We envision all transatlantic routes in the city with a non-stop link between the 20 largest cities in the United States and the EU during the period 2005-2010. [Cities were ranked according to the total number of transatlantic departures.] The data cover 115 routes. Table 2 presents descriptible statistics. We have different airlines that serve a non-stop route as independent competitors, unless they are immunized as members of the same alliance (« ATI airlines »), in this case they are considered to be a single competitor. This definition assumes that unvaccinated members of the same alliance remain powerful competitors. If this is not the case, the price effects we estimate from the loss of a non-stop competitor may underline the magnitude of the actual price effects. In the third quarter of 2010, we found that 52% of transatlantic routes have an independent non-stop competitor, 25% have two independent non-stop competitors and the other 23% have at least three independent non-stop competitors. On 11 routes, there are two non-stop carriers that are ATI carriers and are therefore considered to be a single independent competitor. In 7 of the 11 routes, ATI airlines are the only non-stop service providers. (14) The Sherman Act generally prohibits « very contracts, combinations in the form of trust or any other way or conspiracies, to restrict trade or trade between several states or with foreign nations. » Typically, a trade restriction is an agreement between two or more individuals or entities that influences the competition process. However, under this approach, even contracts to buy and sell a single breach under cartel law appear to be prohibited.

As a result, the courts have limited Section 1 of the Sherman Act (and, therefore, the corresponding section of our national agreement law) to « inappropriate » trade restrictions. Over the years, two different methods have been developed to analyze behaviour in Section 1. Courts now apply either (1) an analysis per se or (2) a broader rule of case analysis to determine whether conduct is contrary to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In this article, we provide new information on the impact of cartel subsidies on the 2005-2010 database and abuse of dominant position on fares paid by passengers.